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I will understand act-consequentialism as the thesis that our moral reasons are reasons to 
bring about impersonally good outcomes; consequently, you morally ought not bring about a 
sub-optimal outcome. By evaluating these consequences impersonally, act-consequentialism 
faces a familiar complaint: it leaves us without personal permissions to pursue our own 
projects or relationships at the expense of maximising the good (Williams 1973; Wolf 1982; 
Scheffler 1982). In this way, act-consequentialism is said to be over-demanding sometimes. I 
will defend the corollary complaint that act-consequentialism is sometimes under-demanding: 
it fails to accommodate the fact that we have moral reasons to bear some costs ourselves, 
rather than pass them off onto others. Let us call these costs “burdens.” To press this 
objection, I will give three examples of burdens. 
 For our first type of a burden, consider our moral reasons to internalise the costs of our 
beneficence. Consider Sonia who decides to climb Mount Kilimanjaro to raise money for the 
Special Olympics. This fund-raising appeals to her, as she loves achievement and adventure. 
But the training and the hike will be gruelling. Let us stipulate that the personal rewards of the 
trip perfectly compensate her for these hardships. Sonia’s choice concerns how to finance the 
trip and raise money for charity. While she is reasonably well-off, her high-flyer friends are 
considerably better-off. Consequently, they get smaller marginal returns from their money 
than Sonia gets from hers. So Sonia would bring about the impersonally best outcome by 
relying entirely on their donations. We may suppose her friends are so indulgent of her that 
they would be willing to donate even if she did not donate herself. Even so, it would be wrong 
of Sonia to rely entirely on her friends for raising money. This would mean she has paid no 
net cost herself, given that the benefits of the trip perfectly balance its hardships. But since it 
  
is Sonia’s project, she has moral reasons to bear some of these costs herself, even though 
allocating them elsewhere would bring about the most good. 
 For our second type of burden, let us turn to leadership. Consider a case where one 
individual has greater responsibility for a project than others have. Suppose you are a 
volunteer in charge of a group made up of four other volunteers. Together, you five are 
cleaning up the riverbank, and you have to decide who is going to clean up which stretch of 
the bank. Four areas are in a reasonably bad state. The fifth is just disgusting. Let us stipulate 
that each member of the team would find cleaning each part of the bank exactly as unpleasant. 
So how shall you divvy up the tasks? You could draw straws, giving everyone an equal 
chance of being left with the unpleasantness. But as the leader of the group, you could simply 
take on the dirtiest bit of the riverbank yourself. Perhaps, taking this option is not on 
incumbent on you, and you would be within your rights to go with the lottery. But all the 
same, you have a moral reason to take on the burden yourself, simply because you are the 
leader of the group. 
 As described, this case is perhaps not conclusive. An act-consequentialist might 
respond that there is an impersonal case for an agent to bear the burdens of leadership: by 
doing so, she sets an example that could have indirect consequences on other people’s 
behaviour. In particular, she could build trust and respect among the group by showing that 
she is committed to the cause, and not exploiting their efforts. In the riverbank case, perhaps 
your selfless mucking around in the filth has this effect on the rest of the team, and 
consequently, the bank ends up much cleaner.
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 This is a fair enough response. I suggest we partly address it by stipulating that the 
members of the team know and trust you well. But this is not yet an adequate way of 
addressing the response because even with this stipulation, we may still expect that your 
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leading by example will motivate the other team members. So to address the response fully, 
we should ask why it would be demoralising for other team members to see a follower do 
more work than a leader, or why it would motivate these team members to see their leader 
taking on more than her fair share. I suggest the reason is that they believe that leaders have 
special moral reasons to bear these burdens. We should join them in thinking this. 
 Third, burdens can arise when someone arrives first to a scene where action is called 
for. After a relaxing weekend, you come into the office only to find an abandoned teacup in 
the sink. You feel a pang of indignation: who has left this here over the weekend! Alas, this 
negligence is common-place, and you know that the person responsible for the cup will never 
wash it up. Instead, the cup will sit there dirty until a kind-hearted soul takes it upon 
themselves to clean it. So you can leave the cup for someone else to wash, knowing that 
eventually it will be done. Or you can wash up the cup yourself. We may suppose that 
considerations of the greater good do not tell one way or the other. All the same, if all else is 
equal, then you have a moral reason to shoulder this burden yourself. Shirking it by thinking, 
“Well that can be someone else’s problem,” would be moral laziness. If you came back later 
to find Maureen giving the offending cup a good scrub, I suspect your cheeks would be tinged 
with shame.  
 I do not suppose these three examples of burdens exhaust all the types of burdens there 
are. But these examples will do to introduce the phenomenon. Given the healthy pluralism in 
the moral philosophy community, I would expect readers to vary with regard to their 
intuitions about cases. Consequently, some readers may not agree with my claims about these 
agents’ moral reasons for action. Alternatively, some readers may agree that the agents have 
these reasons, but offer explanations for these reasons that differ from my explanation. Still, 
by offering a variety of different types of case, I hope that for at least one case, nearly 
  
everyone will share the intuition that the agent in question has a moral reason to shoulder a 
burden. 
 Should we classify these reasons along with our reasons not to violate paradigmatic 
deontological constraints, such as constraints against lying or killing (Scheffler 1982; Nagel 
1986: 164-188; Kagan 1990; McMahon 1991)? My sympathies are with distinguishing 
constraints from burdens.
2
 But since little of substance hangs on this taxonomical question, I 
will leave it open here. Instead, I wish to focus on pressing the challenge that burdens present 
for act-consequentialism as a theory of our moral reasons, by looking for the rationale for our 
reasons to shoulder burdens. 
 We might be tempted to think that these are reasons of fairness. For example, it may 
seem unfair of Sonia to rely wholly on her friends’ donations; these costs should be 
distributed more evenly. But appealing to fairness in a distribution will not give us a general 
account of burdens. This is because burdens arise in cases where there is symmetry between 
the agent and the others who could bear the costs. The dirty teacup case is a paradigm of this 
type of case. From an impersonal point of view, it is just as fair for the burden to be the 
agent’s or someone else’s: both situations involve one person working while the others do 
not. Moreover, it would be silly to say that an agent would be unfair to herself, were she to 
choose herself as the burden-bearer. Correspondingly, it would not be unfair to another to 
pick her as the burden-bearer. What is going on here is not that the agent has general moral 
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reasons to ensure that the costs are distributed in as fair a manner as possible. Rather, she has 
special moral reasons to bear the cost herself, and this is simply because (e.g.) she is first to 
the scene. 
 Instead, I suggest that the case for shouldering burdens appeals to how our moral 
agency interacts with others’ agency in group projects. Take the case of the riverbank 
cleaning. A virtue in a group’s leader is a willingness to take on special costs herself. This is 
because a good leader sees her own individual agency as subordinated to a broader exercise of 
group agency. But being a designated leader is not the only way in which one can relate to a 
group. Sonia has a special position simply as someone who has initiated a fund-raising 
project. As initiator, she has special reasons to bear costs involved with the project. But the 
office-mug case brings out that one need not occupy a higher place in a group hierarchy. 
Instead, you can have moral reasons to bear costs simply because someone in the group must 
do so, and otherwise arbitrary reasons make you salient as the arm of the community. We 
might generalise this rationale, by saying that part of what it is to be a good moral team-player 
is to see oneself as a moral agent keen to look for opportunities to commit one’s abilities and 
efforts to a shared moral cause. By contrast, a bad moral team-player looks for opportunities 
to hang back as a mere onlooker, and leave the group’s work to others. 
 This brings us to why act-consequentialism faces a problem with burdens. As a fully 
impersonal theory, act-consequentialism gives each agent no special concern with her own 
agency. From an impersonal point of view, each agent’s contributions are on a par with 
others’ contributions. When colleagues stand in symmetrical relations to each other, the 
universe has no concern with who bears which costs per se. All that matters is how much 
good is produced, and nothing hangs on which means is used for this end. Not so with us, 
since each of us always occupies a particular perspective. From this perspective, each of us is 
permitted to have personal interests besides morality. But we also are subject to special moral 
  
demands. By ignoring these facts about agency, it is not only the case that act-
consequentialism sometimes demands too much of us. In addition, act-consequentialism 
sometimes demands too little.  
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